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2Do Venture Capitalists Affect
Commercialization Strategies at Start-ups?
ABSTRACT
I empirically study the effect of venture capital (VC) on product development and
commercialization strategy of start-up organizations. In doing so, I segment entrant
commercialization strategies into two camps according to competitive effect: to
“cooperate” is to license-out technology or be acquired, while to “compete” is to develop
technology independently. Building on the work of Gans, Hsu, and Stern (2000) on the
drivers of entrant commercialization strategy, this paper examines the direct and indirect
effects of VC on product development and competition. I start with two important
determinants of start-up commercialization strategy: (1) the entrant’s relative investment
cost of acquiring and controlling complementary assets needed to successfully
commercialize its innovation, and (2) the entrant’s ability to effectively protect its
intellectual property. I then test a novel sample of 118 technology-based projects divided
almost evenly between two mechanisms of entrepreneurial finance. These two
mechanisms differ in institutional detail in ways that allow a quasi-experiment of the
effect of VC on start-up commercialization strategy. The U.S. Small Business Innovative
Research (SBIR) program provides a grant to R&D without taking equity in a start-up or
changing the corporate governance of project development. In contrast, VCs take an
equity stake and participate in corporate governance in exchange for capital. Neither of
these financing mechanisms, however, alters the underlying complementary asset or
intellectual property regime associated with the project. Two main findings about the
commercialization strategy and product market effects of venture capital emerge: (1) VC-
backing skews commercialization strategies across industries toward cooperating, and (2)
VCs make their portfolio firms more sensitive to the business environment.
Keywords: innovation, commercialization, venture capital, cooperation, competition,
complementary assets, intellectual property rights.
3I. Introduction
This paper examines how financing by venture capital (VC) changes the commercialization path
of projects developed by its portfolio firms, a prospect that would have important market
structure and business policy implications. For example, if venture-backed companies are more
likely to be a source of innovative projects or products that can be acquired or accessed by
established companies, incumbent firms would treat these firms differently than if venture-
backed companies were likely to compete against them in the product market. To emphasize
these market structure effects, we categorize entrant commercialization strategies into one of two
groups: to “cooperate” or to “compete.” A contractually based, cooperative strategy for the
entrant involves earning returns from an innovation by licensing out its technology or
participating in a merger or acquisition. A competition strategy entails an independent effort of
commercializing a technology. While the former strategy may diffuse the incumbent’s
competitive threat from entrants, the latter can mean heightened competition in the product
market for the incumbent.
In addition to the differential product market competition effects of entrant commercialization
strategy, the industry incumbent might also alter its own research and development policy in
response to which “type” of entrant (cooperating or competing) it faces (Gans and Stern, 2000a).
The existing literature on VC has not, for the most part, studied the effect of financing modes on
product-level outcomes and development and instead has focused on the role of VCs in
alleviating information asymmetries (e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 1999).1
One difficulty of empirically studying the effect of financing mechanism on commercialization
strategy is establishing an appropriate benchmark to evaluate whether the commercialization
strategies that we observe by venture-backed firms is relatively more or less frequent than we
might expect. To address this challenge, we assembled a novel data set of technical projects that
were primarily funded by one of two financing sources—venture capital and the US Small
Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program—to empirically test hypotheses about product
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4market implications of VC. Due to certain institutional features of these two means of
entrepreneurial finance, (discussed briefly below and in more depth in Section II) we establish
the sub-sample of SBIR-backed firms as a benchmark by which to evaluate the product market
effects of venture-backed firms.
Venture capital represents an important source of organized financing for young, high-tech
companies. Start-ups and young firms “pay” for this capital with equity stakes in their firm and
allow venture capitalists to take active management positions in their firm. Venture capitalists
are thought to aid the development of fledgling firms through both capital infusions as well as
through active management, which is facilitated through a venture capitalist’s network of
contacts and experience in corporate governance (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Bygrave and
Timmons, 1992).
This system of developing commercial high-tech products can be contrasted with another
mechanism of financing innovation in the US. The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
program is a US federal government subsidy program started in 1982 for small businesses. Funds
for the program are provided by various federal agencies, which must set aside a specific
percentage of its federal R&D budget for the program. The SBIR program represents the single
largest source of R&D for small firms in the US, with approximately $1B in grants annually
since 1997 and over $7B between 1983-97. The grant is very “hands-off,” with little to no
federal oversight during the technology development process. In exchange for technology grants,
federal agencies do not receive equity stakes in the firms.
This paper exploits the similarities and differences of these two modes of entrepreneurial finance
to explore how VCs affect entrant commercialization strategy. The analysis begins by building
on the insights of Teece (1986) and Gan, Hsu, and Stern (hereafter, “GHS”, 2000) on technology
strategy. More specifically, GHS (2000) find empirical evidence for the relationship between
variation in the economic environment that start-ups face and their strategy in earning returns
from their innovation. When the start-up faces a weak intellectual property regime, but can
acquire complementary assets for commercialization at relatively low cost, entrants will tend to
compete against established companies due to appropriation risks associated with negotiating
5out-sourced development of its technology. On the other hand, when the start-up faces a strong
intellectual property regime, but face a high cost in controlling complementary assets, start-ups
will seek a contractually-based cooperative solution wherein it licenses out its technology or
participates in a merger or acquisition due to its resulting exchange position. Low transaction
costs in identifying and bargaining with incumbent organizations will also make cooperation
more likely.
Working from this analytic framework, the present study examines the role of VC in shaping a
start-up’s commercialization strategy. In particular, I address two questions: (1) do venture
capitalists skew the choice of commercialization strategy for entrant firms? and (2) are venture-
financed firms more sensitive to the business environment? A VC’s impact on its portfolio firms’
commercialization strategy may come through two means: (1) the venture capitalist’s position as
an information intermediary across its network of contacts may offer opportunities for
cooperation that might otherwise not exist. As well, (2) the VC, through participation in a firm’s
board of directors, can exert a disciplinary role on inventor-entrepreneurs who may otherwise
tend to compromise profit maximization for control of technology development.
A novel data set that includes a sub-sample of projects financed by the SBIR program is matched
with projects financed by venture capital. By exploiting key institutional features of these two
programs, we run a quasi-experiment that isolates the incremental impact of venture capitalists
on project commercialization strategy. Because projects funded by the SBIR program face the
same underlying complementary asset and intellectual property (IP) regime as projects funded by
venture capitalists, the underlying forces that shape an entrant’s commercialization strategy
remain unaltered. In addition, because the SBIR program provides a subsidy to R&D without
taking an equity stake in the organization, corporate governance and commercialization strategy
in SBIR-backed organizations are as they were before the subsidy. In contrast, venture capitalists
routinely take at least one seat on the board of directors of the organization it backs. Because
venture financing changes the corporate governance of project development in the organization,
while SBIR funding entails no such change, we can effectively isolate the effect of venture
capital on project commercialization strategy.
6The proposition that venture-backed firms are skewed toward a cooperative strategy is confirmed
in the empirical evidence, with venture-backing making cooperation more likely. This result
challenges conventional wisdom that VC as a financing institution will usher in a wave of
product market competition against incumbents. For example, consider the following quote by
Chesbrough (1998, p. 19): “When such venture capital is readily available, it allows new firms to
enter the industry, by making high risk/high reward positions available for talented managers and
engineers...Correspondingly, when there is relatively little external capital available for new
venture formation, incumbent firms are not confronted with the prospect of losing people or
customers to new start-up competitors."
A second, though weaker, result is that VCs seem to make their portfolio companies more
sensitive to the business environment, exacerbating the effect of a given regime of
appropriability and complementary assets on the likelihood of cooperation. This finding is
consistent with the notion that VCs play an important role in bringing strategically important
external information to the start-up.
By matching SBIR and VC projects on key observable characteristics and confining the sampled
projects to five high-tech sectors to control for technological opportunity, we set up a quasi-
experiment to isolate the effect of VC on commercialization strategy. There are, however, two
prominent alternative explanations for the results: First, there may be a process of unobserved
selection such that VCs are selecting “good” ventures relative to the SBIR sample. However, it is
unlikely that VCs are selecting ventures based on commercialization strategy (I present statistical
evidence on VC interaction effects with determinants of commercialization strategy in the
empirical results). Even if VCs did select ventures based on strategy, however, conventional
wisdom suggests that the bias would go the other way, that VCs attempt to select projects that
are more likely to result in a competitor company through an initial public offering (Venture
Economics, 1988).
The second alternative explanation for the results is that VC-backed firms are of fundamentally
higher quality than SBIR-backed firms. In order for this explanation to be convincing, however,
there must be some reason to believe that higher quality ventures are more likely to adopt a
7cooperative commercialization strategy. There is no prima facie reason to believe this; as well,
the set of sampled SBIR firms had all successfully commercialized a product. Therefore this
sample consists of a reasonable comparison to VC-backed firms relative to a sample of, say, self-
financed firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes important institutional
differences and similarities between venture and SBIR financing of technology projects as a
prelude to the empirical methodology used in this paper. Sections III and IV develop hypotheses
on how VCs impact the commercialization strategy of start-ups. Section IV describes the
methodology and data of this study, and Section V presents the empirical results. Section VI
concludes.
II. Two Methods of Entrepreneurial Finance
In contrast to two previous studies which have primarily been concerned with evaluating the
SBIR as a public program, (Lerner, 1999; Wallsten 1998), my purpose is to use SBIR-backed
projects as a benchmark by which to evaluate the incremental effect of the non-financing role of
venture capitalists. Instead of focusing on the role of these financing institutions in allocating
entrepreneurial finance per se, I focus instead on their structural differences in assisting
entrepreneurs develop their enterprise. As such, this section proceeds in three stages. Part one
surveys the literature on the role of venture capitalists in financing and developing projects.  Part
two describes the important institutional features of the SBIR program as a means of financing
technology-based projects. Finally, part three argues that the important institutional similarities
and differences of these two financing mechanisms can be exploited in a powerful quasi-
experiment to empirically isolate the role of venture capitalists in commercialization strategies of
start-ups.
8A. What do Venture Capitalists Do?
Background. Venture capitalists raise capital for their funds from both institutions (including
pension funds, insurance companies, and universities) and highly-capitalized individuals.2 These
funds, which are invested in start-ups in exchange for equity in ventures, are typically liquidated
after seven to ten years (though up to a three year extension can be granted).3 VCs therefore use
this time horizon when evaluating investment opportunities.
In an industry survey, Gorman and Sahlman (1989) found that VCs spend a considerable amount
of their time and resources actively monitoring their investments. For example, lead VC firms
make an average of 19 site visits per year to the firms they finance and spend 100 hours per year
in direct contact with the company. Despite this active monitoring, the success rate of VC
investments is far from perfect. One study (Venture Economics, 1988) found that 34.5% of a
sample of VC investments between 1969-85 resulted in partial or complete losses while 6.8% of
the investments returned over ten times the initial capital.
Much of the VC literature has emphasized the oversight role of VCs in new venture development
(Gomper and Lerner, 1999). This paper, while acknowledging that the VC monitoring role is
important, puts forth two additional roles that VC’s play in helping their portfolio firms succeed.
First, VCs may constrain the behavior of inventor-entrepreneurs and focus them on product
development for commercialization success (Roberts, 1991). In addition, venture capitalists
actively network with individuals and firms external to the portfolio firm, and help their ventures
access the labor and capital markets (Hellman and Puri, 1999; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992).
Moreover, these latter two roles are linked: as a result of being in a position as an information
intermediary, VCs are able to guide entrepreneurs on product development and
commercialization strategy, particularly as a result of participating in the firm’s corporate
governance. Each of the three functions and roles of VCs is discussed in turn.
                                                          
2 Capital inflows to- and investments made by- the venture capital industry have grown quickly, with $36.5B in
investments to start-up companies in 1999, a figure that eclipses aggregate venture investments into start-ups for the
previous three years (VentureOne web site, www.v1.com). There is a great deal of cyclicality in the inflows to the
industry, however (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
3 For a discussion of the legal structure of the limited partnership form of venture capital organization, the most
frequent form for venture capitalists, see Sahlman (1990), pp. 489-90.
9Information Asymmetries. An entrepreneur may have the incentive to misrepresent his
technology’s probability of success in the case of exchanging an equity stake for capital. In
addition, entrepreneurs typically cannot offer collateral, as their assets are knowledge-based and
intangible. Providers of private capital realize these potential agency problems, and demand a
risk premium for their capital (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Because entrepreneurs typically have better information about the likelihood of success of their
project than the venture capitalist, a potential adverse selection problem exists. Indeed, Amit et
al. (1997) argue that venture capitalists exist precisely because they develop specialized skills to
select and monitor entrepreneurial projects which reduce information-based market failures.
Researchers have identified two mechanisms by which venture capitalists cope with information
asymmetries: syndication of investments (Lerner, 1994) and disbursing funding in stages, which
depend on VC evaluation prior to each new round of investment (Gompers, 1995). More
generally, financial contracts between VCs and entrepreneurs include multiple covenants aimed
at addressing incentive and information asymmetry problems (Sahlman, 1990; Kaplan and
Strömberg, 2000).
Focusing on Product Development. A much less developed branch of the empirical literature on
the role of venture capitalists is focusing entrepreneurs on product development and curtailing
the tendencies of inventor-entrepreneurs to “excessively” control product development and
commercialization strategy. Empire builders are entrepreneurs who would rather retain corporate
control over the commercialization process of their technology, even if it meant (ex-post) less
profits. Under this view, a key role of venture capitalists is to make the start-up organization
more sensitive to the business environment and to guide the entrepreneur away from his empire-
building tendencies to control development of the technology at the cost of commercial success.
Roberts (1991, p. 146) has described the phenomenon: “Some entrepreneurs want little or no
equity financing at the outset because they wish to retain a maximum amount of ownership and
control.” This is sometimes coupled with what Roberts (1991, p. 328) describes as “founder’s
disease,” the inability of founding CEOs to grow in managerial and leadership capacity as
rapidly as the firm’s size.  Few studies have empirically examined the role of venture capitalists
in counteracting entrepreneurial control and founder’s disease.
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One such study is by Lerner (1995). He looked for evidence on the responsiveness of VCs in
their role as board members in their portfolio companies when there was a greater need for
corporate oversight. He found that an average of 1.75 venture capitalists were added to the board
between financing rounds when the firm’s CEO was replaced in the interval, whereas between
other rounds, only 0.24 venture directors were added. This finding seems to establish the
sensitivity of efforts placed toward monitoring as a function of when it is most needed. Lerner
does not, however, directly relate the oversight role of venture capitalists to the product
development process or to organizational commercialization strategy. Hellman and Puri (1999)
come closer. They find that VCs are more likely to bring outsiders into the position of CEO
when the firm is in a “bad” state (when the firm is not public and it has no products on the
market). Otherwise, Hellman and Puri find that VCs help shape human resource policies and
encourage their portfolio firms to use professional recruiting agencies to hire key personnel.
Venture Capitalists as Information Intermediaries. Researchers in both financial economics
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991) and organizational sociology (Stuart, et al., 1999) have
emphasized the “certification” role that venture capitalist’s play in informing investment bankers
of the underlying quality of their portfolio firms. In the latter study, the researchers find that the
more uncertain is a technology, the more outside evaluators such as investment banks rely on the
status of the firm’s affiliates, such as venture capitalists, to infer quality. VCs may also have a
more direct role in the information intermediation process by identifying and facilitating
cooperative product market opportunities (Burt, 1992; Aoki, 1998; GHS, 2000). Indeed, Kleiner
Perkins, a leading venture capital firm boasts on its web site that it has facilitated over 100
alliances among its portfolio firms.
The venture capital literature has emphasized the monitoring role of venture capitalists as it
relates to tackling information asymmetries rather than the role of venture capitalists as overseers
of entrepreneurial empire building who can change the commercialization path of a technology.
As well, the empirical literature on how venture capitalists, through information-intermediation,
may affect product market outcomes is limited. These gaps in the literature motivate the research
questions in this paper.
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B. The Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Program
Background. The SBIR program is administered through the Small Business Association (SBA),
and American-owned, independent firms with 500 or fewer employees are eligible. Proposals are
peer-reviewed, and funds are awarded competitively.4 The SBIR program is a very “hands-off”
R&D program in that the federal government neither takes an equity stake in exchange for the
grant nor receives any control rights over technology development.
A USGAO (1995) report summarizes the three-fold legislative goals of the SBIR program: (a) to
increase the rate of commercialization of innovations derived from Federal research, (b) to
enhance the “competitiveness” of small firms in technology-intensive industries; and (c) to
enhance the participation of small firms as well as women and minority-owned businesses in the
Federal contracting process.5
The selection mechanism for SBIR has traditionally been on technical merit, though
commercialization potential is increasingly becoming an important selection criteria (USGAO,
1995). Companies seem to participate in the SBIR program for a multitude of reasons, ranging
from straightforwardly seeking a subsidy to internal R&D expenditure to validating a project for
internal political reasons.6 In addition, SBIR recipients can receive multiple grants for related
areas of R&D.
C. Exploiting Differences in these Financing Mechanisms
By examining technical projects that have been funded primarily by VC on the one hand, and
primarily by the SBIR program on the other, we expect to isolate the effect of key sources of
                                                          
4 There are two rounds of potential awards. The maximum phase I award, earmarked for proof of concept and idea
development, is $100,000. For the period 1991-93, for all 11 participating federal agencies, the average ratio of
funded Phase I proposals to proposals received was 13.3% (USGAO, 1995). Phase II awards are capped at $750,000
and is a grant for developing a technology and exploring its commercial potential. Only those firms with a Phase I
award are considered for a Phase II award.
5 Economically, public subsidies for technology development in small firms may be justified for several reasons.
First, R&D by small, innovative firms is believed to generate positive knowledge spillovers (Jaffe, 1986). Left on
their own, these firms would likely under-invest relative to the socially optimal level due to their inability to
appropriate the full value of their invention (Arrow, 1962).
6 I reached this conclusion as a result of field-based interviews with approximately 25 executives at SBIR firms
during the pilot phase of this research project.
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variation on the commercialization strategy of the start-up organization. The source of project
finance is independent of two important drivers of commercialization strategy: the ability of
entrants to exclude others from exploiting the entrant’s technology for commercial gain and the
feasibility of start-ups to acquire and control the necessary complementary assets for commercial
success (GHS, 2000). At the same time, the financing mechanisms do vary in the corporate
governance of project development and in ownership stakes in the firm. The purpose of this sub-
section is to explore the comparability of VC- and SBIR-backed projects.
Venture capitalists select the firms they wish to fund by reviewing business plans, which
consider both the technical and commercial merits of an idea; meanwhile, SBIR program
administrators select projects based on a peer-review process. These peers, however, are not
necessarily experts in commercializing technology—they are typically technologists or
academics evaluating the technical merits of a project proposal and whether the proposal
matches the government agency’s Request for Proposals (RFPs). Despite this difference in
selection mechanism, VC-backed enterprises have not necessarily been more successful
commercially. For example, Lerner (1999) provides empirical evidence that SBIR firms
performed better commercially than matched VC-backed firms if the SBIR organization was
located in a zip code that had high levels of early-stage venture capital activity. He interprets this
result as indicative that SBIR awards play an important role in certifying firm quality to the
private investment community for future rounds of financing.
A second important difference between the financing mechanisms is the industrial representation
of their investments. Venture capitalists tend to concentrate their investments in a much narrower
range of technical projects—particularly in the communications and information technology
sectors—relative to the SBIR program.7 While the SBIR program finances a wider distribution of
R&D projects, there is empirical evidence that the selection mechanism favors funding infra-
marginal rather than marginal projects (Wallsten, 1998; Gans and Stern, 1999). This bias in
SBIR project selection would tend to narrow any gap in the quality of projects funded between
the SBIR program and venture capitalists. In addition, as further discussed in the methodology
                                                          
7 For venture capital statistics on investments by industrial area, see the Pricewaterhouse-Coopers “Money Tree”
web site: http://204.198.129.80/index.asp (accessed 6/15/00). In addition, Gans and Stern (1999) construct Gini
coefficients showing that VC investments are skew relative to private R&D expenditures.
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section of this paper, in compiling my sample, I selected projects from five high-tech industrial
segments that have drawn interest from both venture capitalists and SBIR program
administrators in an effort to mitigate the importance of these technological opportunity selection
effects.
Despite these differences in selecting projects between the two financing mechanisms, there are
many similarities in the inputs to- and characteristics of- the SBIR and VC financed projects.
First, the selectivity of projects from a numerical standpoint is similar: about 1% of business
plans proposed to venture capitalists gets funded—versus approximately 5% for Phase II SBIR
grants. In addition to the approximate age similarities between successful VC- and SBIR-funded
projects, the levels of funding for successful VC and SBIR recipients have not been that different
historically (Lerner, 1999). Through 1995, the average VC investment in a firm was
approximately $2M (Gompers, 1995). Meanwhile, because successful SBIR recipients typically
receive multiple Phase II awards for technology development, the average project gets funded at
roughly the same level.
In sum, the comparability of the SBIR program as a different, but similar mode of
entrepreneurial finance than venture capital provides a natural setting in which to study the
incremental effect of venture capital on product development and commercialization strategy.
III. What Determines the Optimal Commercialization Strategy for Start-ups?
This section introduces a contingency framework for entrant commercialization strategy. While
GHS (2000) present a theory-to-evidence study of this phenomenon, that paper is not focused on
the role of VC on project management. Their framework is an important prelude to this study,
however, as venture capitalists operate in an environment in which the dynamics of competition
between entrants and incumbents will importantly shape the realm of possible exit strategies for
their investments. This section therefore reviews the drivers of start-up strategy proposed by
GHS (2000) and Gans and Stern (2000b).
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A. Introduction
Researchers have noted the productivity of small, entrepreneurial firms in generating ideas and
technical advances that become the basis for valuable innovations (Acs and Audretsch, 1988).
Despite their innovativeness, these firms are not always the ones profiting from their
technological inventions, largely due to their inability to control complementary assets and
prevent others from expropriating the value of their inventions (Teece, 1986). In this Teecean
framework, established firms are better able relative to small firms to commercialize
technologies because of their control over important complementary assets.
Another stream of research has emphasized a contractually-based “ideas market” mechanism by
which the entrepreneurial organization can appropriate the value of its invention by bargaining
with established companies to transfer control over the development of its technology (Salant,
1984; Anton and Yao, 1994; Gans and Stern, 2000a). This position stands in contrast with the
classical mechanism of Schumpeterian competition in which the market power of incumbent
monopolists is destroyed through a “perennial gale of creative destruction” by entrepreneurial
organizations (Schumpeter, 1942).
Clearly, an ideas market is not always enabled, however; otherwise entrants would uniformly
earn returns from their invention by selling control of their technology to established firms.
Doing so would avoid duplication of research effort and allow a division of labor by which
entrants invent and incumbents commercialize.
B. Commercialization Strategy: Competitors vs. Cooperators
In order to capture and study the implications of stylized start-up commercialization strategies, I
partition them into two camps. I term an entrant a “competitor” if it has decided to remain
independent in its commercialization strategy, deciding not to merge with another company and
not licensing out its technology for potential development by another firm. Entrants not taking a
competitor strategy are “cooperators.” This is a useful partitioning of the world from a product
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market point of view since it separates strategies which reinforce market power of entrenched
firms (cooperator) from those that destroy market power (competitor).8
The impact of a merger or acquisition of a small firm on product market competition is clear:
ownership and control rights to the technology are transferred to the acquiring firm. The
competitive implications of out-licensed technologies are less clear. While firms sometimes
license out their technology patents only for specific applications, the licensor does not
necessarily retain control rights over the subsequent product—and in this sense reinforces market
power of the entrenched firm. Having mapped some business policy decisions onto product
market competition space, I now delve into more details about the determinants of
commercialization strategy.
C. Dual Drivers of Commercialization Strategy
Appropriability Regime. The first dimension of the framework is an appropriability regime,
which “refers to the environmental factors, excluding firm and market structure, that govern an
innovator’s ability to capture the profits generated by an innovation” (Teece, 1986, p. 287). This
dimension is an important determinant of entrant commercialization strategy because the
decision to negotiate with established firms to commercialize an innovation would depend on
capturing the economic value of its innovation. This proposition is illustrated by Arrow’s (1962)
“disclosure effect” dilemma: if an entrepreneur tries to sell rights to his innovation, a potential
buyer does not know how to value it. However, if the entrepreneur discloses the idea to the
buyer, the buyer may no longer be interested in paying for the idea since he now knows it. Such
appropriability problems are particularly acute when the intellectual property regime is weak.
When the disclosure effect is particularly strong, organizations will have a difficult time
contracting out their technologies for development.
                                                          
8 While engaging in strategic alliances also “softens” product competition, the competitive implications of engaging
in a strategic alliance on the one hand, and licensing out a technology or being acquired on the other, are distinct. By
engaging in a strategic alliance, a start-up organization does not necessarily lose control over the development of its
technology. Even in the case of a joint venture, a third party is established in which each alliance partner retains
some control over the resulting entity. A secondary motivation for treating alliances differently is because very few
small organizations are able to remain entirely independent in its operations—and adopting the more expansive
definition of “competitor” would render the distinction meaningless.
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Importance of Complementary Assets. The second determinant of commercialization strategy is
the entrant’s relative investment costs of acquiring or controlling complementary assets, which
have been defined as “those assets and capabilities that need to be employed to package new
technology so that it is valuable to the end user” (Jorde and Teece, 1990, p. 83). Such
complementary assets may be “generic” if they are not tailored to the innovation at hand. They
may be “specialized” if there is unilateral dependence between the innovation and the
complementary asset, or they may be “co-specialized” if there is a bilateral dependence (Teece,
1986). Presumably, the more “specific” is the asset to the particular innovation, the higher is the
cost in attaining the asset due to the problem of hold-up. In addition, depending on the industry
and the nature of the innovation, entrants will face different costs in acquiring and/or controlling
the set of complementary assets needed to successfully commercialize their innovation.
Teece identified a set of four important complementary assets—manufacturing, distribution
channels, brand development, and servicing resources—control over which may be important
across industrial sectors in profiting from technological innovation.
Control over manufacturing is likely to be differentially important across industries as a result of
heterogeneity in economic and sociological forces in the industries. The cost of internal
development of the product, the number of competing manufacturers that could produce the
product, and the expected duration of the relationship between the start-up and the manufacturer
are all important factors governing internalization of the manufacturing process for the entrant
(Tripsas, 1997).
A second key complementary asset for young companies is a distribution channel for their
products. Again, the importance of control over distribution depends on the industry. In the
medical device industry, for example, corporate relationships with hospital administrators and
doctors, often accomplished through personal relations between the sales force of a company and
the health care actor, are essential for selling a product to the end user (Mitchell, 1989). Because
assembling a dedicated sales force is very costly for entering medical device companies, the
bargaining power of established and start-up firms in this industry is affected accordingly. At the
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other end of the spectrum are industries in which (commodity-like) products are sold through
competitive distribution networks.
A third complementary asset is developing a brand name through investing in marketing or
advertising (Teece, 1986). Developing brand recognition is more important in some industries
than in others for earning returns from innovation. For new entrants in the application-specific
integrated circuit industry, for example, associating products with reputable companies (e.g.,
IBM) and advertising the association is important in earning returns.
A final complementary asset is servicing resources for the product (Mitchell, 1989; Tripsas,
1997). In some industries such as computer hardware, which requires periodic servicing, control
over maintenance and computer help lines may be important in persuading customers to
purchase the product, while in other industries such as biotechnology, such servicing may not be
at all important in earning returns from the project.
Interaction of Complementary Assets with Appropriability Regime. The interaction of
complementary assets with the ability of entrants from excluding others from exploiting its
technology can also be important (Tripsas, 1997). For example, because source code in the
software industry can effectively be encrypted and transferred to a manufacturer to burn CD-
ROMs, pre-packaged software companies do not have to have direct control over this production
process (through internalization). More generally, such an interaction exists because the ability
of innovators to prevent imitation of its technology enables it to build or acquire complementary
assets needed to successfully commercialize the technology (Teece, 1986).
C. Characterizing Start-up Environments
These two drivers of commercialization strategy suggest that start-ups in different industries face
different environments in interacting with established firms. When innovating entrants face a
weak intellectual property regime while the cost of acquiring complementary assets is relatively
low, strong disclosure effects will prevent the ideas market from developing, and so entering
firms will be competitors with established companies (Gans and Stern, 2000a; GHS, 2000).
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On the other hand, when innovating entrants enjoy a strong IP regime but face relatively high
investment costs in controlling complementary assets, entrants tend to earn its returns from




These propositions are summarized in Figure 1. Empirical work characterizing the off-diagonal
boxes of the matrix in which start-ups face “mixed” environments remains as an interesting area
of future research. For example, Gawer (2000) begins to address some of the issues in the upper
right hand box in the case of Intel’s interaction with complementary, innovative up-starts. Based
on this section, we are now ready to begin our point of departure from start-up
commercialization strategy in general to the effect of VC on this process.
IV. How Do Venture Capitalists Affect Commercialization Patterns?
A. VC Effects on Selection of Commercialization Strategy
Using the contingency matrix introduced in the previous section as a baseline, what effect does
financial backing by venture capitalists (and its attendant transfer of some degree of corporate
control to the VCs) have on the commercialization strategy of the start-up organization? This
section develops two hypotheses on whether venture capitalists “skew” their portfolio firms’
commercialization strategy in one direction, and if so, whether they make their portfolio
companies more “sensitive” to the external business environment. The answer to these questions
will shed light on the economic effects of venture capitalists on the structure of competition in
high-tech markets.
Because most modern VCs are organized as limited partnerships, they typically try to exit their
investments in no longer than seven to ten years after initial investment. Venture capitalists have
four main ways of exiting their investments: liquidating the portfolio company (not placing
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additional capital into the organization), selling equity back to the entrepreneur or managers and
employees of the portfolio organization, merging the company with another firm, or taking the
organization to the public markets through an initial public offering (IPO).
Conventional wisdom holds that venture capitalists’ most preferred exit strategy is to take a firm
public. According to a Venture Economics study (1988), this strategy pays $1.95 in excess of
each dollar invested (with a mean holding period of 4.2 years).  The payoff from taking a firm
public is far more than the $0.40 return per dollar from the next best option, having the
independent firm acquired over a 3.7 year average holding period. While VCs have the incentive
to select ideas that they believe have the highest likelihood of becoming the basis for stand-alone
firms, this incentive may be tempered for two reasons. First, VCs face a time constraint on
investment payback, which is imposed by the limited partnership form of organization. In
addition, there may inherently be a limited number of technological opportunities that can form
the basis of new, public companies.
In part, the ability of VCs to take their portfolio companies public depends on the strength of the
IPO market, which depends more on the macroeconomic conditions of the economy than on the
economic fundamentals of a start-up company (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Regardless of the
macroeconomic environment, however, researchers are beginning to recognize the importance of
cooperative VC exit strategies for their start-ups (Aoki, 1998).
Aside from the direct VC control aspects of exiting their portfolio investments, VCs may also act
as information intermediaries through participating on multiple boards of directors. While no
direct evidence on this phenomenon has been documented for venture-backed companies, the
interlocking directorates literature has emphasized the importance of this mechanism for
information flows (Davis, 1991). Indeed, venture capitalists may be uniquely positioned to
facilitate cooperative exit strategies as they fill nodes of an information network that contains
potentially complementary technological opportunities (Burt, 1992). A venture capitalist’s
network of contacts, both through its own portfolio companies and through its relations with the
capital and labor markets (Hellman and Puri, 1999), may thus reveal and facilitate opportunities
for cooperative arrangements for the start-up. I therefore hypothesize:
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H1: Start-up organizations financed by venture capital, regardless of industrial segment, are
more likely to take a “cooperator” strategy in commercializing their technologies.
B. VC-mediated Sensitivity to the Environment
A stylized fact about some entrepreneurs is their penchant to retain as much ownership and
control over their technology as possible, even when the founder-CEO is unable to effectively
manage the enterprise (Roberts, 1991). Informal evidence suggests that venture capitalists are
able to exert disciplinary control over the young venture by helping the company monitor its
business environment while simultaneously participating in the firm’s corporate governance
(Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). Managerial control by the board of directors is not necessarily
confined to replacing the chief executive of the organization. Such control can also take the form
of changing the commercialization path of a technology through the choice of whether to license-
out a technology or to entertain an acquisition bid, for example.
The previous section described two key elements of the business environment, the
complementary asset and intellectual property regime. Because venture capitalists are active in a
range of activities and functions that cut across industrial segments, they are more likely than
internal directors of the company to be aware of threats and opportunities in the business
environment. Indeed, because business environment differ by industry, or even by project, the
external knowledge that VCs bring in guiding corporate strategy may importantly shape how the
start-up firm decides to earn returns from its innovation. The mechanism by which this is
accomplished is a combination of exterting control over entrepreneurial “founder effects”
through corporate governance, and solid knowledge of the external business environment.
Consequently, I hypothesize that venture capitalists exert disciplinary control on their portfolio
companies by making them more responsive to their business environment:
H2: Venture capitalists “boost” the sensitivity of start-ups to their business environment, thereby
reinforcing the drivers of cooperation and competition strategies proposed in Figure 1.
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IV. Methodology and Data
A. Methodology
By sampling a population of projects funded by the SBIR program and pairing this sample based
on key observable characteristics—four-digit SIC code and approximate sales level—with a
sample funded by venture capitalists, I create a pool of high-tech projects with varying sources of
project finance. Using SBIR-backed projects as a benchmark, this matching method permits a
quasi-experiment in studying the effect of financing by venture capitalists on commercialization
strategy, thereby providing a powerful way to test H1 and H2.9
Because projects funded by the SBIR program face the same underlying complementary asset
and IP regime as projects funded by venture capitalists, the underlying forces that shape an
entrant’s commercialization strategy remain unaltered. Yet, because venture financing changes
the corporate governance of project development in the organization, while SBIR funding entails
no such change, I can effectively isolate the effect of venture capital on project
commercialization strategy. Matching projects in this way, while an imperfect method, aims to
address a gap in the strategy and venture capital literatures by using sources of exogenous
variation in a natural setting to run a quasi-experiment.
B. Data
Data to empirically test propositions about the relationship between financial backing of
technical projects and commercialization strategies and product market outcomes was collected
in a two part effort: I first collected information through a survey instrument on SBIR-backed
companies. Following Lerner (1999), I subsequently assembled and surveyed a sample of VC-
funded companies, matched to the SBIR sample, based on four-digit industrial code and
approximate sales level.
Assembling the SBIR Data. In a survey of SBIR-backed companies conducted between January
to March 1999, I collected detailed firm and project level data for 100 projects from 99
organizations whose technical development was funded in large part through the SBIR program.
                                                          
9 This method builds in natural controls, thereby under-sampling high-flying venture-backed firms, for example.
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To be included in the sample, firms had to have a commercial product available on the
marketplace. While this requirement might have been a constraint on the whole population of
SBIR-backed companies, this constraint was usually not binding for the firms surveyed here
since I drew from a list of the most successful SBIR recipients.10 I imposed this condition
because I am interested in relating financing mode to commercialization strategies. In the case
that an organization had more than one commercial product, I asked the respondent to select the
most important project from a revenue standpoint. Firms were selected from a publicly available
list (posted on the SBA web site) of top SBIR winners.
On the firm level, I collected background information on the organization’s employees and
promotion policies; financial information about corporate ownership, expenditures and revenues;
and corporate governance issues. On the project level, each company was asked to provide
information on the commercialization and financing history of the technology project, including
revenues through sales and licensing of the technology, the importance of the technology in
achieving various goals of the firm, key personnel involved in setting the commercialization
strategy of the company, and information about the commercialization strategy itself. Table 1
describes and defines the relevant variables used in the empirical analysis.
To measure the ability of the start-up organization in excluding others from exploiting its
technology (the appropriability regime), I asked executives to rate—on a five point Likert
scale—the importance of each of the following in deterring imitation of the firm’s project: trade
secrecy, patent or copyright protection, and patent or copyright litigation (or the threat of such
litigation). For example, when managers rated the importance of trade secrecy as high on the
Likert scale, I interpret this as suggesting a weak IP environment. The reasoning behind this
interpretation is that projects that rely on secrecy to avoid expropriation of the commercial value
of the underlying invention are vulnerable. As a more objective measure of the IP regime,
PATENT THRESHOLD is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the project has
been awarded at least one patent, a condition that 65% of the projects fulfill.
                                                          
10 Selecting SBIR projects this way is also likely to diminish concerns of “quality” differentials with the VC-backed
sample.
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To measure the importance of complementary assets, I asked executives from our sample
companies to rate, also on a five point Likert scale, the importance of control over each of the
following in earning returns from their technology-based innovation: manufacturing, distribution
channels, brand development, and servicing resources. I use this set of questions as a measure of
whether it is feasible for entrants to acquire or control complementary assets necessary to exploit
their invention, reasoning that executives would rate each complementary asset high if he or she
believed the asset was attainable at reasonable cost.
In the empirical analysis, in addition to using the measure CA DISTRIBUTION LIKERT, I use
CA MAX LIKERT, the maximum Likert score over a set of complementary assets necessary to
commercialize a given innovation, as an indication of whether control over any of the assets
were important for earning returns from the technology-based project.
Assembling the Venture-backed Sample. Following Lerner (1999), I assembled a matched set of
firms receiving venture capital financing (but not SBIR funding) using four digit SIC codes and
approximate sales. Companies were matched using a two-step procedure. First, I searched the
Venture Economics database (through Security Data Corporation’s Platinum Database) for
candidate venture-backed companies whose primary line of business matched the four-digit SIC
codes for the sample of SBIR-backed companies. I eliminated those companies that received
SBIR funding (based on a database publicly available through the SBA web site). Finally, I
consulted the Corptech Directory of Technology Companies (1998) to select only those firms
within the four-digit SIC code that approximately matched the sales revenue of the SBIR sample,
and surveyed the closest-matched firms. This was done in June and July of 1999. Whenever
possible, I used publicly available databases to confirm information from the survey responders.
For example, I verified the number of patents assigned to each organization through both the US
Patent and Trademark Office’s web site and the IBM patent database.
The overall response rate to the survey was approximately 50%. Firms contacted but not
responding seemed to be randomly mixed between firms not having a commercial product and
those too busy or not willing to respond. Within the organization, the respondent was typically
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one of the following individuals: the director of R&D, the director of sales or marketing, or the
CEO. Most of the surveys (approximately 75%) were filled out over the telephone, with the
balance either faxed or mailed back.
While the SBIR sample of companies includes representatives from nine two digit SIC codes, we
eventually used 86 of these SBIR companies across five high-tech industrial segments. This
results from the fact that the SBIR funds a much broader array of technological opportunities
relative to venture capital. The sample includes 55 VC-backed projects and 86 SBIR-backed
projects, for a total of 141 projects whose primary focus is in one of five SIC codes. Two sectors
are drawn from projects at the four digit SIC level: biotechnology and pre-packaged computer
software. In addition, three sectors are drawn from projects at the two digit SIC level: industrial
machinery & equipment, electronic & electrical equipment, and instruments (including medical
devices).11 Because 23 observations are missing information on complementary asset ratings, the
final sample consists of 118 observations.
C. Summary Statistics
While Table 1 defines and describes variables, Table 2 presents summary statistics of the sample,
presented as a whole and divided into the VC and SBIR sub-samples. VC companies were
disproportionately cooperators (44%) relative to SBIR firms (25%). Capital inflows to the
projects seemed to differ by financing mode, with $2.3M for the average SBIR project and
$16.7M for the average VC-backed project, though measurement error probably plagues these
statistics.12 Finally, the number of patents also seemed to differ between the two sub-samples:
8.7 awards on average for VCs and 4.9 awards for SBIRs.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the sample based on two-digit SIC code and mode of
commercialization strategy (either cooperating or competing). Notice that projects backed by
VCs have (much) higher correlations with a cooperation commercialization strategy, a pattern
                                                          
11 Analysis of a similar data set of 55 SBIR-backed firms matched with 55 comparable VC-backed firms yield
qualitatively the same results as those presented in this paper.
12 Measurement error in these data are considerable, however, as we relied on SBA lists of SBIR awards and the
Venture Economics database to supplement missing data on the financial history of project development from our
survey. The SBA lists underestimate capital inflows into project development, as private sources of capital are not
taken into account.
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which holds for four of the five industrial segments. For example, for the two-digit SIC sector,
electronic equipment, 67 percent of the cooperating projects were VC-backed, while only 37
percent of the competing projects were VC-backed. Similarly, for the four-digit SIC code for
biotechnology, 60 percent of the cooperating projects were financed by VC, while only a quarter
of the competing projects were VC-financed. While these summary statistics are suggestive, they
do not reflect any statistical control, an issue I now take up.
V. Empirical Results
A. Venture Capital and Commercialization Strategy
Table 4 shows the result of basic VC probit regressions of the likelihood of taking a cooperator
commercialization strategy. The positive and significant coefficient on VC is preserved in a
regression that provides no controls (4-1) to a regression controlling for industry effects (4-2), in
which the excluded industry is INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS. The basic VC result persists in (4-
3), which controls for industry, firm-level, and project-level effects. BASELINE EMPLOYEES
and PROJECT INFLOWS are meant to capture initial project resources, while the CEO
FOUNDER variable is a measure of potential “founder” effects, which may affect the
commercialization path of a given technology. While the set of regressions presented in Table 4
begin to support the hypothesis that venture capitalists skew the commercialization choices of
start-ups in their portfolio across industrial segments, my main results are presented in Table 5.
Table 5 shows the core effects of VC, the IP regime, and the relative cost for the entrant in
controlling the necessary complementary assets to effectively compete against incumbents. How
does mode of project financing (and its accompanying effects on corporate governance and
accessing a network of information regarding cooperation partners) affect commercialization
patterns of the start-up organization, given the Gans and Stern (2000b) framework on start-up
commercialization strategy? First, note the persistent VC effect across these regressions while
controlling for the dual commercialization drivers presented in Section III. Moreover, the
magnitude and economic importance of the VC effect is substantial. Using equation (5-1), at the
mean values of the independent variables, the predicted probability of cooperation as a
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commercialization strategy for venture-backed companies is 44.2 percent, while the
corresponding likelihood for non-venture financed firms is only 22.9 percent, a difference of
almost 100 percent difference in the likelihood of cooperation.
Table 5 also shows that the coefficient on CA MAX LIKERT is negative and significant,
suggesting that as entrepreneurs face lower costs in acquiring and/or controlling necessary
complementary assets to compete against incumbents, they will choose to compete against them.
This result is robust to industry effects (5-2 through 5-5) and project-level effects (5-5). In
addition, the result is robust to an alternate measure of the cost of controlling complementary
assets, CA DISTRIBUTION LIKERT, a result demonstrated in Table 6. While more objective
measures of the costs of controlling complementary assets facing entrants in different industrial
segments would be preferable, establishing comparability of cost data for these assets in a range
of industries is a formidable task. As far as I know, more objective complementary asset cost
measures comparable across industries have not yet been developed. Therefore the Likert
measures presented here represent a second-best solution of measuring executives’ beliefs about
the relative costs of acquiring complementary assets.
The second main driver of commercialization strategy, the intellectual property regime, is also
affirmed in the data. The estimates indicate that the stronger is the IP regime that the entrant
faces, the more likely is the start-up to cooperate with established companies in the course of
commercializing its technology. On its face, this result seems paradoxical, but as Gans and Stern
(2000b) and GHS (2000) elaborate, cooperative behavior is facilitated as a result of a strong IP
regime because the entrant can enter into negotiations with the incumbent over technology
transfer without fear of expropriation. In addition, this result is consistent with the GHS model
suggesting that the relative rate at which a strong appropriability regime facilitates cooperation is
increasing faster than the rate at which entrants are tempted to compete against incumbents as a
result of the intellectual property protection. This result is robust to industry effects (5-2 through
5-6), project-level effects (5-2), and the particular measure of IP, as documented throughout
Tables 5 and 6. While one of the IP measures is derived from Likert ratings, TRADE SECRECY
LIKERT, a second measure, PATENT THRESHOLD, is more objective in that it measures
27
whether a project has at least one patent associated with it. Table 6 demonstrates that PATENT
THRESHOLD is significant and robust to both industry and firm effects.
Finally, there is empirical evidence for an interaction effect between the IP and complementary
asset regime. For example, in (5-1) through (5-5), the interaction term between TRADE
SECRECY LIKERT and CA MAX LIKERT is positive and significant. This suggests that for a
given complementary asset cost regime, the incremental effect of loosening the IP regime is to
make cooperation a more likely commercialization strategy. While this interaction effect seems
to mitigate the direct IP effect on the probability of cooperation, the hypotheses developed in this
paper do not make empirical predictions about this interaction effect.13
The industry effects in Tables 5 and 6 show that biotech firms are more likely to adopt a
cooperator commercialization strategy. This result is consistent with industry-level analyses that
suggest that the combination of a strong IP regime (patents are particularly effective in this
sector), together with the high costs of manufacturing and distributing downstream products
(drugs) makes biotech cooperation a more likely commercialization outcome (BioWorld, 1998).
B. Venture Capital Effects on Sensitivity to the Business Environment
The interaction term between VC and the IP regime variable TRADE SECRECY LIKERT is
significant in equations (5-1) through (5-5). I interpret this result as suggesting that for venture-
backed firms, the marginal effect of loosening the intellectual property regime is to make a
competitive commercialization strategy more likely, a result consistent with H2. The magnitude
of the VC * IP interaction term in Table 5 is about one-third as large as the direct IP effect,
suggesting that the interaction effect is relatively important. To explore the robustness of this
result, I use a more objective measure of the IP regime, PATENT THRESHOLD, in Table 6. The
significance of the IP interaction effect with VC is weakened, though as industry and project-
level controls are added to the analysis, the VC * IP interaction term is strengthened. Indeed, this
interaction term is significant at the 20 percent level (in the anticipated direction) in equation (6-
3) when the full complement of controls is included. Therefore, the proposition that venture
                                                          
13 Notice that the economic importance of this interaction effect is relatively low (with magnitudes of between 20-25
percent of the CA and IP variables). Unreported regressions reveal that controlling for this interaction effect is
important, however.
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capitalists make startups more sensitive to the intellectual property environment in ways that
reinforce the drivers of start-up commercialization strategy is supported in this data.
In addition, the evidence for a VC interaction effect with the complementary asset regime is
moderate. In Table 5, equations (5-4) and (5-5) show that the significance of the VC * CA MAX
LIKERT term is weak. However, in Table 6, when the individual measure of relative
complementary asset costs, CA DISTRIBUTION LIKERT, is used, the VC * CA interaction
term becomes strongly significant. This result suggests that for venture-backed projects, as the
cost of attaining and controlling complementary assets is lowered, the start-up is more likely to
compete in the product market. Moreover, the magnitude of this interaction term is quite
important, as it is approximately the same as the direct effect of the CA regime on the probability
of cooperation in Table 6. What accounts for the strengthened VC * CA interaction result when
the CA measure is a Likert measure of importance of distribution assets? Perhaps venture
capitalists pay particular attention to the role of distribution channels in helping their portfolio
companies shape their commercialization strategy. More generally, however, I interpret these
Likert-based results cautiously because of the difficulty of comparing the measures across
projects. As previously stated, this method, while not perfect, is a first attempt at constructing a
cross-industry measure for the relative cost of acquiring complementary assets.
Taken together, the VC interaction effects with the IP and complementary asset environments of
its portfolio firms are supported. This evidence in support of H2 suggests that venture capitalists,
by making the start-up organization more sensitive to the business environment, have the effect
of separating out the four boxes of the commercialization matrix (Figure 1) even further relative
to the entire (unconditioned) sample of technical projects.
VI. Caveats and Conclusions
This paper has been primarily concerned with the question of how developing technology
through the venture capital process changes the commercialization path of the technology
through the choice of adopting a compete or cooperate strategy. Partitioning commercialization
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strategies into this dichotomous classification system emphasizes the competitive implications of
each strategy. To study how venture capital changes commercialization patterns, I use two
benchmarks. First, in order to establish a baseline by which to gauge which commercialization
strategies might be expected across high-tech industries regardless of financing mechanism, I
adopt the GHS (2000) framework of IP and complementary asset regime drivers of entrant
commercialization strategy. A second benchmark uses SBIR-funded projects to establish a
counterfactual financing mechanism that not only mitigates the capital constraint of
entrepreneurs, but also differs in institutional quality from VC.
A novel data set of venture capital backed companies matched with SBIR funded firms across
five high-tech industrial sectors was assembled to empirically examine how VC may alter the
commercialization strategy of its start-ups. This method leaves the complementary asset and IP
regime unaltered for the entire sample, while keeping the corporate governance of project
development constant on a (SBIR-backed) sub-sample. The source of variation between the
SBIR and VC sub-samples is then attributed to the non-financial role of venture capitalists.
Such a method relies on an assumption of a single distribution of companies from which venture
capitalists and SBIR grant administrators are selecting projects to fund. While a similar method
has been used by other researchers (Lerner, 1999) to study different research questions, the
following section discusses potential selection biases as a result of this method. The paper
concludes with two final sections: policy implications and possible extensions of this research.
A. Issues of Selection Bias
What factors might systematically affect the likelihood of a technical project being funded by
VC versus the SBIR program? First, it is well-known that VCs concentrate most of their
investments in communications, information technology, and the health sciences. In order to
address the limited industrial representation of venture investments, I selected five industrial
segments in which both venture capitalists and SBIR were active in investment as a crude way to
control for technological opportunity.14 Furthermore, the fact that VC- and SBIR-funded projects
                                                          
14 Over the past two years, venture capital has increasingly become concentrated in Internet concerns while the SBIR
does not appear to fund pure-play “dot com” companies (nor should they, given the private capital inflows to that
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in this sample were being commercialized at approximately the same time (in 1990 on average)
represents a control for the strength of the IPO market, an important correlate of market
opportunity (Gompers and Lerner, 1999).
A second source of systematic selection would result if SBIR applicants were more concerned
with control issues relative to small businesses that pursue VC financing. Under this scenario,
“empire builders” are more likely to be attracted to the SBIR program than to venture funding. If
the entrepreneur elects venture financing, not only may he have to give up equity interest in his
firm, he also faces the threat of being removed from the management team, thereby losing
“control” of his technology. Therefore, one might predict that if SBIR recipients were
systematically more concerned with control issues, they would be less likely than the VC-backed
firms in seizing upon profitable cooperation opportunities. The proposition that some
entrepreneurs might not be profit maximizers—and instead value a path of control over
profitability—is difficult to resolve because entrepreneurs will rarely know ex-ante which
commercialization strategy—to compete or to cooperate—will yield higher profits ex-post. The
best measure of potential empire building tendencies in the survey instrument is CEO
FOUNDER, an indicator variable that equals one when the CEO of the firm is a founder of the
firm. A simple t-test of this variable from the sample does not uncover a difference between the
sub-samples.15 In addition, my qualitative interviews with SBIR recipients suggest a multitude of
reasons outside corporate or technological control for seeking SBIR funds.16
Finally, one might wonder whether venture capitalists select projects in which to invest based on
the likelihood of being able to exercise a particular commercialization strategy (cooperation).
This is unlikely to be the case, however, because of the interaction effect that VCs have with the
IP environment of their portfolio companies (H2). That is, VCs would not make portfolio
companies more sensitive to the business environment if the venture capitalist had already
selected a commercialization strategy, ex-ante, for the start-up. I interpret the VC interaction
                                                                                                                                                                                            
sector). This current asymmetry in sector of funding does not present a problem for this study as historical funding
interests between the two financing mechanisms were not as divergent.
15 In addition, in unreported regressions, when I regress COOP on CEO FOUNDER and INSIDER EQUITY, I do
not detect differences in the result when I condition by SBIR and VC sub-samples.
16 Field notes from these interviews are on file with the author.
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effect as suggesting that venture capitalists choose commercialization strategies in an effort to
maximize their return from developing a technology.
A “gold standard” (true) experiment would have be to randomly assign technical projects to be
funded by venture capital or the SBIR program. Unobserved selection would not be an issue in
this ideal world since there would be no forces of systematic selection that would bias the sub-
samples of projects financed by the two mechanisms. Given the realities of social science, this
true experiment is not available, of course. Instead, we adopted a methodology that made a
comparison of projects with similar observed characteristics, backed by similar but differing
sources of entrepreneurial finance. We then argued that prominent alternative processes that
might have generated the results are unlikely.
B. Policy Implications of this Work
Several nations (e.g., Singapore, Israel, and Germany) have begun adopting industrial policy
toward venture capital with the assumption that subsidies to this industry will help foster the
competitive advantage of technology-based industries in their countries. Not only does the
imitability of US-style venture capital depend on many difficult-to-replicate features such as the
social network aspect of this institution, it is unclear whether encouraging the limited partnership
legal form of organizing venture capital is the best course of action for all countries given the
evidence presented here. If venture-backed firms are indeed more likely to commercialize their
technologies via a cooperate strategy, national governments will have to weigh this alongside
other factors, such as whether reinforcement of an industrial structure that favors established
organizations is a desirable policy outcome.
More generally, the business policy implications of this research for established companies is a
better understanding of the economic drivers of commercialization strategy for start-up
organizations. Incumbents in industries in which start-ups tend to favor a cooperative
commercialization strategy should encourage innovation by entrants because the established
firm’s market power is not threatened. On the other hand, in industries in which the start-up’s
commercialization strategy is likely to be one of competition, established firms should adopt
business policies to prepare accordingly. In industries in which venture capitalists are most
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active, managers at the incumbent firms might adopt a bias that entrants will more likely be
sources of innovative ideas that can be accessed through licensing or acquisition.
C. Future Directions
This study might usefully be extended in at least two ways. First, in order to better understand
and directly test both the information-intermediation and disciplinary roles of venture capitalists,
more detailed and micro-level data must be collected. Such data collection is costly, but perhaps
fine-grained case studies, which explore the role of venture capitalists in developing
commercialization strategy in start-ups through these dual mechanisms, would be a useful next
direction. Another interesting study would be to more systematically investigate the mixed
business environment captured by the upper right hand corner of Figure 1. Such a study would
investigate entrant and incumbent commercialization strategies in a world in which the
innovative entrant faces both a weak IP regime and a relatively high cost of acquiring
complementary assets to enter the product market.
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CONTINGENCY MATRIX OF ENTRANT
COMMERCIALIZATION STRATEGIES17
Is it Feasible (at reasonable cost) for the Entrant to Acquire or






prevents ideas market from
developing
* Start-ups are competitors
Incumbents have upper hand
Incumbents may try to access start-
up’s innovation by profit-sharing.
Incumbents may try to establish a
broad network to learn about
technological opportunities.



















































In practice, a rarely
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* No empirical prediction
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PROBABILITY OF COOPERATION
COOPERATE Dummy =  1 if project revenues include licensing
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PATENT LIKERT 5-Point Likert scale rating of importance of
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Number of employees at the start of the project MIT Survey
CEO FOUNDER Dummy = 1 if the current CEO is a founder of the
firm
MIT Survey
INSIDER EQUITY Percentage of the company held by management
and employees of the firm
MIT Survey
PRODUCT-LEVEL VARIABLES
INFLOWS Monetary inflows into the project MIT Survey
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MEANS & STANDARD DEVIATIONS
FULL SAMPLE
             (N = 118)
SBIR SAMPLE
               (N = 63)               (N = 55)
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.     Mean
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
COOPERATE .339 .475 .254 .439
APPROPRIABILITY MECHANISM VARIABLES
TRADE SECRECY LIKERT 3.678 1.371 3.714 1.396
PATENTS 6.678 14.189 4.889 7.353
PATENT
THRESHOLD
.653 .478 .667 .475




4.627 .596 4.683 .591
DISTRIBUTION LIKERT 3.263 1.330 3.397 1.302
FIRM-LEVEL VARIABLES
VC           .466          .501          0        N/A     1
BASELINE EMPLOYEES       25.481      43.662        23.691      34.120   27.340
CEO FOUNDER           .598          .492           .635          .485       .556
INSIDER EQUITY       43.378     37.503       55.339      39.776   29.387
PRODUCT-LEVEL VARIABLES
PROJECT INFLOWS         9.190     19.445         2.692        4.253   16.688
TIME TO MARKET       44.925     49.068       52.810      56.952   35.592
PRODUCT INNOVATION           .678         .469           .683          .469       .673
INDUSTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES
BIOTECH           .136         .344           .127         .336       .145
INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT           .102         .304           .063         .246       .145
ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS           .305         .462           .270         .447       .345
INSTRUMENTS           .339         .475           .413         .496       .255
SOFTWARE           .119         .325           .127         .336       .109
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TABLE 3
PAIRWISE VENTURE CAPITAL CORRELATIONS
BY INDUSTRIAL SEGMENT






STAT. COOP COMP COOP COMP COOP COMP COOP COMP COOP COMP
Mean     .600     .250     .750     .333     .667     .367     .375     .258     .250     .455
St. Dev.     .516     .463     .500     .488     .492     .490     .500     .445     .500     .522
VENTURE
CAPITAL





Dependent Variable = COOPERATE




















































Log Likelihood -86.579 -83.442 -78.092





Dependent Variable = COOPERATE































































































































Log Likelihood -69.563 -65.951 -62.601 -61.685 -61.573





AND COMPLEMENTARY ASSET MEASURES
Dependent Variable = COOPERATE
N = 118 observations






               (6-2)
(6-1) with industry
controls





































































Log Likelihood -64.305 -60.835 -59.194
Note: *, **, and *** indicate coefficients are significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
